A Multipolar Asia in a Multipolar World

As new frameworks emerge, how will the future of Asia look?

The following is an editorial by Warwick Powell, Senior Fellow of Taihe Institute

Asia is undergoing profound transformations, reflecting a shift away from regional primacy toward a more Asia-centric order. This shift can be understood against what Fernand Braudel called the longue durée. The evolution of power in Asia has been shaped by the arc of European colonialism, beginning in the early 1500s, and later, the rise of American hegemony following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, as the unipolar world order fades, Asia is re-emerging as a center of considerable sovereign agency, marked particularly by China's ascendancy and a re-calibration of regional dynamics. These dynamics are also being impacted by non-regional dynamics, particularly the global fallout from the situation in Ukraine, America's reconfiguration of priorities toward security and the containment of China, and the re-emergence of Russia.

The Long Arc: Asia Before and After European Colonialism

Before European colonial powers arrived, Asia was home to sophisticated and interconnected economic systems. The Indian Ocean trade network, the Silk Road, and regional trading hubs such as Malacca facilitated commerce, cultural exchanges, and political interactions independent of European influence. These networks linked China, India, Persia, and Southeast Asia through a web of maritime and overland routes that enabled the exchange of goods, ideas, and technologies.

One of the defining features of this pre-colonial period was the emergence of entrepôt trading cities, which acted as intersection points for commerce, cultural exchange, and geopolitical mediation. Malacca, for example, functioned as a crucial node in the maritime trade system, linking the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. It served as a melting pot where merchants from China, India, Persia, and the Middle East converged, facilitating not only trade but also diplomatic exchanges. These cities played a stabilizing role in the region, allowing different polities to manage tensions through commerce and negotiation rather than military confrontation.

China's historical interactions with Southeast Asia were extensive and multifaceted. The tributary system, which was principally a diplomatic and trade framework, allowed regional kingdoms to engage with China on mutually beneficial terms. The Ming Dynasty's naval expeditions under Admiral Zheng He (1405-1433) exemplified this engagement, as his fleet visited numerous Southeast Asian ports, fostering economic and political ties. The Kingdom of Ayutthaya (present-day Thailand), for instance, maintained close commercial and diplomatic relations with China, securing stability and prosperity. Similarly, Vietnam, despite periodic conflicts, remained deeply integrated with Chinese political and economic structures for centuries.

These longstanding interconnections underscore that Asian civilizations historically engaged with the largest regional power - China - through a framework that delivered relative prosperity and shared security. The arrival of European colonial powers disrupted these longstanding local networks, replacing them with exploitative economic systems and dividing the region into artificial spheres of influence. However, the long history of intra-Asian cooperation and economic interdependence suggests that as the post-colonial order evolves, the region may increasingly revert to patterns of engagement centered around Asian enterprises rather than external intervention.

The Unipolar Conjuncture: The Era of American Primacy

Following the end of World War II, the United States actively sought to secure its strategic and economic interests in Asia. The Cold War provided the ideological framework for these efforts, with US foreign policy officially centered on the containment of communism. However, beyond ideological opposition to communism, American military interventions in Asia also served broader economic objectives, including securing markets, maintaining access to raw materials, and ensuring favorable conditions for US capital. Between 1945 and 1991, the United States engaged in multiple conflicts across Asia, shaping the region's political and economic landscape.

One of the earliest instances of US involvement in post-war Asia was its support for the Nationalist government of China during the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949). While officially aiding Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) against the communist forces led by Mao Zedong, US support was also motivated by concerns over the potential loss of China as a significant market for American goods. However, the communist victory in 1949 led to the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the US maintained its formal ties with the Republic of China (ROC), headquartered on the Taiwan island, as the legitimate Chinese government for three decades.

The Korean War (1950-1953) marked the first large-scale US military intervention in Asia during the Cold War. Under the pretext of repelling North Korean aggression and preventing the expansion of communism, the United States deployed significant military resources to the Korean Peninsula. Beyond ideological concerns, the war solidified the US presence in East Asia, particularly in South Korea and Japan, ensuring American economic influence over regional trade and industrial policies. The conflict also reinforced Japan's role as a key US ally, with its post-war reconstruction heavily financed by American capital.

During the First Indochina War (1946-1954), the United States supported French efforts to retain control over Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This intervention, although indirect, was motivated by concerns that a communist victory would disrupt regional economic stability and diminish Western influence. Following France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the United States escalated its involvement, leading to its direct military engagement in the Vietnam War (1955-1975). While the Vietnam War was framed as a battle to prevent the spread of communism, it also had economic dimensions. The war ensured continued US influence in Southeast Asia and fueled American defense industries. However, the conflict ultimately ended in a US withdrawal and the reunification of Vietnam.

The US also conducted extensive covert operations and bombing campaigns in Cambodia and Laos during this period. The goal was to disrupt North Vietnamese supply routes and prevent communist expansion. The bombings devastated local economies and societies, yet they also prolonged US military-industrial spending, benefiting American defense contractors.

In the late Cold War period, the United States played a significant role in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). By providing arms and financial support to Afghan mujahideen fighters against Soviet forces, the US aimed to weaken the Soviet Union and limit its influence in South Asia. This conflict contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet economy while reinforcing US strategic positioning in the region.

Across these conflicts, the United States consistently sought to align ideological imperatives with economic and strategic objectives. By maintaining military bases in key locations such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the US ensured access to Asian markets and secured favorable trade conditions. Additionally, sustained military spending bolstered American defense industries, demonstrating the interconnection between war and economic interests.

From American Unipolarity to Multipolarity

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the United States as the world's sole superpower, a status that Washington leveraged to entrench its dominance in Asia. Through a combination of military alliances, economic engagement, and institutional influence, the United States maintained a strategic presence that shaped the post-Cold War order. However, the rise of China, particularly in the 21^st century, has increasingly challenged America's regional hegemony, marking a transition from unipolarity to a more contested geopolitical landscape.

The United States' military supremacy in Asia was largely underpinned by a vast network of security agreements and military installations. The US Seventh Fleet, headquartered in Japan, became the linchpin of America's Indo-Pacific strategy, ensuring maritime security and projecting power across the region. Security alliances with Japan (under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security), South Korea, and the Philippines provided Washington with military basing rights, enabling a rapid-response capability. The continued presence of US forces in Okinawa and Guam further reinforced strategic deterrence against erstwhile adversaries.

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, US economic policy in Asia revolved around fostering trade, investment, and financial liberalization. The United States was a key driver of economic globalization, championing free trade agreements (e.g., the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement) and leading financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, which promoted Washington-backed economic models.

However, China's economic rise fundamentally altered the regional balance. China's GDP surged from 1.2 trillion USD in 2000 to over 14 trillion USD by 2020, surpassing Japan as the world's second-largest economy. In purchasing power parity terms, China's economy actually surpassed that of the US around 2014, according to IMF estimates. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, facilitated infrastructure investment across Asia, Africa, and Europe, increasing China's economic interconnectivity. By 2021, China had become the largest trading partner for most Asian economies. The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016 further signaled China's intent to provide an alternative to US-led financial institutions.

By the 2010s, the effectiveness of US primacy in Asia faced increasing constraints. China's military modernization, particularly through the development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and stronger presence in the South China Sea, challenged US naval dominance. Economically, Washington's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017 weakened US leadership in regional trade, while China played a strongly supportive role in ASEAN's eight-year efforts to form the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP is the world's largest multilateral free trade agreement and came into effect in 2022. These shifts demonstrated the declining ability of the United States to unilaterally dictate regional economic frameworks.

Shifting Economic Power in Asia: The Decline of US Influence

The global economic landscape is undergoing a significant transformation, with Asia emerging as the primary engine of growth and China solidifying its role as the region's economic nucleus. This shift is most evident in trade dynamics, investment patterns, and financial institutions, which increasingly reflect a move away from US economic dominance.

China has overtaken the United States as the leading trade partner for almost every Asian nation. According to the ASEAN Secretariat, as of 2023, China accounted for over 30% of ASEAN's total trade volume, compared to the United States' share of approximately 10%. The RCEP further cements China's centrality. The RCEP, which includes China but excludes the US, is projected to boost intra-Asian trade by 500 billion USD annually by 2030. This trade realignment signals a long-term commitment to regional economic integration, diminishing the influence of US trade policies.

China's BRI has profoundly reshaped investment flows in Asia. Since its inception in 2013, the BRI has directed over one trillion USD into infrastructure projects across the region. Indonesia exemplifies this trend, having received 100 billion USD in Chinese investments for high-speed rail, ports, and energy infrastructure. In contrast, US investment in Indonesia remains significantly lower, with Washington struggling to match China's scale and speed of financial commitments. This investment disparity highlights China's growing economic leverage, as recipient countries increasingly rely on Chinese funding for critical infrastructure.

The financial landscape of Asia is also shifting, as regional institutions gain prominence over traditional Western-led entities. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, launched in 2016 with China as its largest shareholder, now has over 100 member countries and has approved 50 billion USD in loans. This positions it as a formidable competitor to the World Bank and the IMF, both historically dominated by the US. Moreover, the rise of yuan-denominated trade is reducing Asia's reliance on the US dollar. More than 25% of China's trade is now settled in yuan, a figure that continues to grow as Beijing forges currency swap agreements with major trading partners. The dollar's diminishing role in Asia's trade settlements weakens US monetary influence and enhances China's ability to dictate regional financial trends.

The increasing alignment of Asian economies with alternative multilateral institutions further reflects the region's strategic shift. Indonesia has formally joined BRICS as a full member, and Asian countries like Malaysia and Thailand have become partner countries of the group. Trade among BRICS nations has surged by 56% between 2017 and 2022, fostering deeper economic ties independent of Western influence. This shift indicates a growing preference for multipolar financial and trade systems that reduce dependency on Western-led institutions.

The Military Erosion of American Primacy in Asia

The United States' uncontested military dominance during the unipolar era (1991-2019) has waned due to significant shifts in global power dynamics. Two key factors - China's military modernization and the development of hypersonic weapons - have eroded America's relative superiority.

China's rapid military advancement has narrowed the gap between the United States and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), particularly in naval power, missile technology, and cyber warfare. The US Department of Defense's 2023 China Military Power Report highlights China's progress, stating that the PLA Navy has become the largest naval force in the world, surpassing the US Navy in ship count with over 370 vessels. This expansion includes modern aircraft carriers, such as the Fujian, which features advanced electromagnetic catapult launch systems, enabling power projection capabilities that rival US carrier strike groups.

Additionally, China's missile force has been significantly enhanced through the development of advanced anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) such as the DF-21D and DF-26, often referred to as "carrier killers." These weapons pose a considerable threat to US naval operations in the Asia-Pacific, particularly within the first and second island chains. The PLA's modernization efforts also extend to cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, which could disrupt US command and control systems in the event of a conflict.

The advancement of hypersonic missile technology by China and Russia represents another challenge to American military preeminence. Hypersonic missiles, which travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5 and possess maneuverability that complicates interception, have altered strategic calculations. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports that the US lags behind its adversaries in hypersonic weapons deployment, with American programs still in development while China and Russia have already operationalized such systems. Hypersonic systems have been deployed in the Ukraine theater, demonstrating their combat effectiveness and (to date) the inability of Western technologies to intercept these systems.

China's DF-17 missile system equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), capable of evading traditional missile defense systems, entered active service as early as 2019. This development grants China a significant first-strike capability, particularly in regional conflicts where US assets are stationed. Similarly, Russia's Avangard hypersonic system, which can carry nuclear payloads, underscores the growing strategic imbalance. The US, by contrast, continues to test its hypersonic systems, with programs like the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) facing developmental setbacks and delays.

Russia's Re-Emergence and the Multipolar Geopolitical Economy of Asia

The geopolitical and economic landscape of Asia has long been analyzed through the lens of the United States-China rivalry. However, this perspective overlooks two critical factors reshaping the regional order: Russia's re-emergence as a Eurasian power and the strategic significance of its Far East and Arctic trade networks. These developments introduce new layers of complexity to Asia's geopolitical economy and reinforce the notion that the global order is increasingly multipolar. Additionally, Russia's deepening ties with India further underscore its growing influence in the region.

Russia has historically been viewed primarily as a European power, but its strategic focus has gradually shifted eastward. This pivot has been driven by economic imperatives, political realignments, and security considerations. Over the past decade, Russia has actively pursued comprehensive economic agreements across Asia, engaging with nations such as China, India, Vietnam, and North Korea. The deepening of these relationships is evident in trade partnerships, infrastructure development, and energy cooperation.

One of the most significant aspects of Russia's Asian strategy is its expanding role as a key energy supplier. Russia is a leading exporter of oil and gas to China, India, and other Asian economies. Following Western sanctions in response to the Ukraine conflict, Russia has reoriented its hydrocarbon exports toward Asia. The Power of Siberia pipeline, which supplies natural gas to China, exemplifies this shift. Furthermore, discussions are ongoing regarding the construction of Power of Siberia 2, which would further integrate Russia into the Asian energy supply chain.

Beyond economic ties, Russia has sought to deepen its security relationships in Asia. It maintains longstanding military partnerships with India and Vietnam and has recently expanded defense cooperation with North Korea. Moscow's growing security ties with Pyongyang, which include potential arms transfers and military technology exchanges, signal a strategic re-calibration in the region. These partnerships highlight Russia's ambition to establish itself as a security guarantor beyond Europe, reinforcing its position as a Eurasian power.

Russia's easternmost territories, particularly Siberia and the Russian Far East, have become focal points for economic expansion and geopolitical maneuvering. The region is rich in natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals, and timber, making it a strategic asset for Russia's economic and trade ambitions. To attract investment and development, Moscow has launched initiatives such as the Eastern Economic Forum, which promotes business collaboration between Russia and Asian partners.

A key element of Russia's eastward expansion is the development of the Arctic trade network, particularly the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Climate change and technological advancements have made Arctic navigation more viable, reducing transit times between Europe and Asia. The NSR offers an alternative to traditional maritime trade routes, such as the Suez Canal, and strengthens Russia's position as a central player in global trade. Russia has actively invested in Arctic infrastructure, icebreaker fleets, and energy projects to capitalize on this emerging trade corridor.

China has emerged as a crucial partner in Russia's Arctic strategy, aligning with the Belt and Road Initiative. The two nations have collaborated on Arctic shipping projects and energy exploration, further integrating their economic interests. However, Russia's control over the NSR also enables it to maintain strategic autonomy, ensuring that it remains a key stakeholder in Arctic geopolitics.

Another critical dimension of Russia's growing influence in Asia is its long-standing relationship with India. The India-Russia partnership is rooted in historical ties, military cooperation, and shared strategic interests. Despite India's growing alignment with Western powers, particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), it continues to maintain strong defense and energy ties with Russia. India remains one of the largest importers of Russian arms, acquiring advanced military equipment such as the S-400 missile defense system. Additionally, Russia has been a key supplier of crude oil to India, particularly in the wake of Western sanctions on Russian energy exports. This economic and security cooperation highlights India's strategic balancing act - maintaining partnerships with both Russia and Western nations to safeguard its national interests.

Furthermore, Russia and India collaborate in multilateral forums such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), advocating for a multipolar world order. These platforms allow Russia to engage with Asia's emerging powers while countering Western-dominated global institutions.

Russia's resurgence as a Eurasian power, its economic and security engagements across Asia, and its Arctic trade ambitions underscore a broader trend toward multipolarity. The increasing complexity of Asia's geopolitical economy reflects a shift away from the binary US-China paradigm. Instead, multiple actors - including Russia, India, and other regional stakeholders - are shaping the continent's strategic landscape.

By expanding its influence in Asia, Russia not only diversifies its economic and security partnerships but also challenges the traditional Western-led global order. The evolving dynamics in Asia illustrate how regional powers are asserting their autonomy and redefining international relations in an increasingly interconnected world. As Russia continues to solidify its role in Asia, its actions will have far-reaching implications for global trade, security, and diplomacy in the decades to come.

The Reconfiguration of Security Architecture in Europe and Asia: Implications of the Ukraine Conflict

The defeat of the collective West in Ukraine has catalyzed discussions about a reconfiguration of the European security architecture. With the US initiating peace negotiations with Russia, there is growing speculation that the resolution of the Ukrainian conflict could serve as a catalyst for a broader redefinition of security arrangements, not just in Europe, but across Eurasia.

In December 2021, Russia circulated two draft documents aimed at redefining security relations with the United States and NATO. These documents sought to address Russia's strategic concerns while also proposing a framework for a new European security architecture based on the principle of indivisible security. This principle, rooted in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, asserts that the security of one state should not come at the expense of another. However, historical precedent shows that this concept did not translate into an equitable security balance in Europe, as NATO expansion continued eastward, exacerbating tensions with Russia.

Given the shifting geopolitical landscape, a reexamination of this principle is timely. If the United States and its allies acknowledge Russia's security concerns, a post-Ukraine settlement could lead to a restructuring of European security that is less reliant on NATO-centric arrangements. Such a system could involve the establishment of new security mechanisms, possibly under the aegis of a broader Eurasian framework that includes non-Western actors.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has suggested that the security architecture of Europe cannot be examined in isolation but must be considered within the broader context of Eurasia. This perspective aligns with China's vision for a multipolar world order. Over the past two decades, China has championed alternative security mechanisms, including the SCO, which emphasizes non-alignment, economic cooperation, and conflict resolution outside of Western-led frameworks.

One intriguing development is the concept of a "peace club" proposed by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and supported by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Such a notion could expand upon existing institutions like the SCO, incorporating a broader range of Asian nations under a common security umbrella. Russia has already solidified strategic agreements with North Korea and Vietnam, both of which maintain a wary stance toward US military presence in Asia. Expanding cooperative security initiatives across Eurasia could provide an alternative to the US-led system of alliances, which is often perceived as exclusionary and confrontational.

China's Global Security Initiative (GSI), launched in 2022, underscores principles of mutual respect, non-interference, and sustainable security. These principles closely mirror those of the 1955 Bandung Conference, which laid the foundation for the Non-Aligned Movement. ASEAN's continued commitment to these ideals suggests that an alternative security framework in Asia - one that eschews military blocs and prioritizes regional dialogue - would find broad acceptance.

Given Asia's complex security dynamics, such a system could prove appealing to nations wary of entanglement in great-power rivalries. For instance, ASEAN states have long resisted pressures to formally align with either the US or China. A Eurasian security framework that incorporates elements of the GSI and the Bandung Principles could offer a viable alternative that prioritizes regional stability over ideological confrontation.

Even as the United States seeks to disengage from Ukraine, its broader strategic priorities remain clear: homeland security and the containment of China. The US Indo-Pacific strategy, coupled with AUKUS and the Quad, underscores Washington's commitment to counterbalance or even contain China's rise. However, as security frameworks in Europe shift, there may be ripple effects in Asia, particularly if regional actors perceive US commitments as unreliable or counterproductive to long-term stability. Punitive trade tariffs and other coercive measures from the new US administration may contribute to this perception.

If a new European security structure emerges - one that limits NATO's expansion and redefines US-Russia relations - it could embolden Asian nations to pursue greater strategic autonomy. This could manifest in increased regional cooperation through initiatives like the SCO and a gradual shift away from US-led security alliances. Such a development would signal the emergence of a genuinely multipolar world order, in which Western dominance is no longer the defining characteristic of international security arrangements.

Toward an Asia After the Europeans

Drawing back to the longue durée, the unfolding shift in Asian geopolitics represents a broader movement toward decolonization and regional sovereignty. As Asia navigates the decline of American primacy, it faces the opportunity to construct a post-European regional order rooted in historical economic interconnections, strategic autonomy, and multipolar stability. Whether this transition occurs peacefully or amid increased tensions remains uncertain, but the contours of an Asia-centric future are increasingly taking shape.

The resolution of the Ukraine conflict could serve as a watershed moment in global security dynamics, triggering a reconfiguration of not only European security but also the broader Eurasian landscape. Russia's security proposals, combined with China's GSI and ASEAN's commitment to non-alignment, suggest a growing preference for cooperative security mechanisms over military blocs. As the US re-calibrates its strategic focus, the evolving security landscape may accelerate the transition toward a multipolar world order, wherein Western-led security structures no longer hold a monopoly on global stability.

Ultimately, the viability of such a transition will depend on the willingness of major actors to engage in genuine dialogue and respect mutual security concerns. Whether in Europe or Asia, the future of security may well depend upon the recognition that stability is best achieved through inclusion rather than exclusion, cooperation rather than confrontation.